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NOTES
WHO HAS THE RIGHT?: ANALYSIS OF SECOND
AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO
18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4)
Alexandra T. Cline*
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”1

INTRODUCTION
On December 28, 2005, Bradley Beers told his mother he had placed a
gun in his mouth, had nothing to live for, and that he was going to kill himself.2 A college student at the time, Beers was armed with both a musket he
used for Civil War reenactments and with the determination to end his life.3
Fortunately, he never had the chance. Before tragedy struck, Beers’s mother
intervened and brought him to a local hospital for a mental health evaluation.4 Beers was involuntarily committed under Pennsylvania law after a physician found him depressed and suicidal, such that “inpatient treatment was
needed for his safety.”5 His involuntary commitment was extended twice in
the months that followed, and he was deemed to be “severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment” at two separate court proceedings.6 However, soon after Beers was released, he attempted to purchase a firearm yet
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Arts in
Journalism and Politics, Washington and Lee University, 2019. I thank my colleagues on
the Notre Dame Law Review for their careful editing and thoughtful feedback. I also thank
my family and friends, especially my parents, for their unwavering support and
encouragement. All errors are my own.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
2 Beers v. Lynch, No. 2:16-cv-6440, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166492, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 5, 2017).
3 Id. at *4.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Brief for the Appellees at 6–7, Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (No.
17-3010).
1623
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again.7 While Beers perhaps considered himself rehabilitated and deserving
of a second chance to possess a firearm, his constitutional right to exercise
that privilege is far from certain.
When the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in 1791,8 its ratifiers perhaps had not considered its specific implications for individuals such as Beers. Rather, its provisions likely reflected the
sentiment of the times—prevailing distrust of standing armies and military
rule.9 At that time, “[n]either hunting nor self-protection, individually
speaking,” seemed to prompt the nation’s Founders to cement the right to
keep and bear arms.10 Instead, the Amendment responded to the fear that
Congress possessed too much power to build a national standing army and
thus to disarm state militias.11 Nonetheless, the right to bear arms in the
Founding era was always premised on certain qualifications, namely a person’s status as white, male, able-bodied, and typically of certain religious affiliation.12 As such, selective disarmament continued even after the
Amendment’s ratification, preventing Native Americans, free and enslaved
African Americans, and others from keeping or bearing arms.13 These
restrictions were grounded on the notion that certain individuals throughout
history have been considered “too dangerous, too radical, or too unpredictable to have weaponry.”14
While many scholars have historically viewed the Second Amendment as
providing a collective right, particularly in the context of protecting state
militias,15 judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment has shifted in
recent years. In 2008, the Supreme Court held for the first time in District of
Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to
bear arms, unattached to organized militia service.16 Justice Scalia, writing
for the majority, concluded that the prevention of tyranny, through state
militias, was only one motivation behind the ratification of the Amendment.17 Indeed, Justice Scalia thought, the Amendment was also understood
7 Id. at 7.
8 Right to Bear Arms, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/interactiveconstitution/amendment/amendment-ii (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
9 See Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521, 526 (N.J. 1968); Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, Federal
Constitutional Right to Bear Arms, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 696 § 2 (1978).
10 Meg Penrose, A Return to the States’ Rights Model: Amending the Constitution’s Most Controversial and Misunderstood Provision, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (2014).
11 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 Penrose, supra note 10, at 1473.
13 Id. at 1473–74.
14 Id. at 1474.
15 Id. at 1481–82.
16 Heller, 554 U.S. at 582–84; see also Penrose, supra note 10, at 1476.
17 Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; see also Spenser F. Powell, Note, Constitutional Law—The Second Amendment—The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Firearm Possession by Individuals Previously
Committed to a Mental Institution, 84 TENN. L. REV. 561, 570 (2017).
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at the time of ratification as codifying a “pre-existing right” to bear arms for
self-defense.18
Nonetheless, the Heller Court acknowledged that even an individual
right to bear arms is not unlimited.19 In fact, Justice Scalia wrote that “nothing in [Heller] should be taken to cast doubt” on the constitutionality of
“longstanding prohibitions” on firearm ownership for certain categories of
people, including felons and the mentally ill.20 While Scalia deemed those
particular prohibitions presumptively lawful, the Heller Court declined to
define the full scope of the Second Amendment right,21 leaving unanswered
questions for lower courts.22 Instead, the Heller Court merely recognized the
right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to own firearms, without deciding
who falls within the confines of that classification.23
One notable question that remains after Heller is whether “presumptively
lawful” prohibitions on firearm ownership,24 specifically for those considered
mentally ill, can include lifetime bans. As the law stands today, individuals
who have been “adjudicated as a mental defective or who [have] been committed to a mental institution” at any time are categorically barred from possessing firearms.25 That prohibition, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), has
given rise to a circuit split in the past five years, with the Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits reaching different conclusions on its constitutionality. In each
case, the plaintiff argued that, at least as applied to him, § 922(g)(4) violates
the Second Amendment.26 While the Third and Ninth Circuits rejected the
challenges,27 the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings,
holding that the government had failed to meet its burden of showing that a
lifetime ban on firearm possession reasonably fit the statute’s goals.28
Though ultimately reaching different conclusions, each circuit applied a twopart test to evaluate the challenges.29 First, the court determines “whether
the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.”30 If it does, courts proceed to the second step and “apply an appro18 Heller, 554 U.S. at 603; see also Powell, supra note 17, at 570.
19 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see also Powell, supra note 17, at 570.
20 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler I), 775 F.3d 308, 316 (6th Cir.
2014), rev’d en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
23 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
24 Id. at 627 n.26.
25 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
26 Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2019); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Tyler II), 837 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2016); Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106,
1109 (9th Cir. 2020).
27 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
28 Tyler II, 837 F. 3d at 699.
29 See id. at 685–86; Beers, 927 F.3d at 153; Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
30 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113 (quoting United States v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th
Cir. 2019)).
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priate level of [heightened] scrutiny.”31 However, if the opposite conclusion
is reached at step one, the inquiry is over and the provision is constitutional.
This Note argues that courts should decide challenges to § 922(g)(4)
solely under the first step of the test, based on the notion that individuals
subject to § 922(g)(4) fall outside the scope of Second Amendment protection. Thus, under the two-part test, the law would not burden conduct protected by the Amendment, rendering step two unnecessary for at least the
vast majority of § 922(g)(4) challenges. This Note provides three independent ways in which courts could deem § 922(g)(4) outside the purview of the
Second Amendment, and each should be considered a permissible approach.
The first Part of this Note provides background information on the relationship between mental illness and violence in the United States, which
established the rationale for the enactment of § 922(g)(4). Part II then considers the text of § 922(g)(4), including opportunities for relief from the firearm prohibition. Next, Part III discusses the implications of recent Supreme
Court Second Amendment jurisprudence for § 922(g)(4), which has provided the backdrop for lower court analysis. Part IV then summarizes recent
§ 922(g)(4) decisions across three circuit courts, in which they interpreted
the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence and offered their own analyses.
Finally, Part V provides three alternative approaches that courts could use
when evaluating challenges to § 922(g)(4), based on the framework provided
in the recent circuit court holdings.
I. MENTAL ILLNESS

AND

VIOLENCE

IN THE

UNITED STATES

Though civil commitment has existed in the United States for hundreds
of years,32 reliable statistics about the practice largely remain unavailable.33
Due to patient privacy issues and a decentralized U.S. mental health care
system, the exact number of individuals subject to involuntary commitment
each year is not publicly known.34 However, in 2015, a branch of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services estimated that only nine out of
every 1000 people with a “serious mental illness” had been involuntarily committed that year.35 Generally, data also suggest that involuntary commitments have decreased over the past several decades, as a movement toward
deinstitutionalization has taken shape.36
31 Id. (quoting Torres, 911 F.3d at 1258); see also United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d
1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013).
32 Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience,
43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCIS. 209, 210 (2006).
33 Nathaniel P. Morris, Detention Without Data: Public Tracking of Civil Commitment, 71
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 741, 741 (2020).
34 Id.
35 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE MENTAL HEALTH CARE CONTINUUM: HISTORICAL TRENDS
AND PRINCIPLES FOR LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (2019), https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/
files/civil-commitment-continuum-of-care_041919_508.pdf [hereinafter SAMHSA].
36 Id.
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Further, state laws governing involuntary commitment have tightened
over the past century, limiting the types of individuals subject to these commitments.37 By 1980, almost every state had implemented a dangerousness
requirement in its involuntary commitment statute38—a requirement that
remains an important criterion in state laws today.39 In fact, in many of these
statutes, the individual must pose a threat of serious bodily harm to himself
or others before involuntary commitment can be imposed.40 As a result, the
dangerousness criterion usually refers directly to an individual’s risk of
engaging in violent acts.41 Nonetheless, a finding of dangerousness is not
required in every statute; instead, some allow for involuntary commitment
upon a finding of “grave disability.”42 The latter is usually defined as an
“inability to provide for basic personal needs,” such as food and shelter.43
Finally, most states also allow for involuntary commitment only when an individual’s needs cannot be met in a less restrictive setting.44 Thus, if a
caregiver or other outpatient setting could adequately provide for the person’s care, he or she will not meet the statutory guidelines for involuntary
commitment.45
II. BACKGROUND

AND

TEXT

OF

§ 922(G)(4)

To combat the general misuse of firearms, various prohibitions on gun
ownership have existed throughout the nation’s history.46 As courts and
scholars have noted, the Second Amendment has inherently been “tied to
the concept of a virtuous citizenry,” such that the government has always
retained the power to “disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”47 Congress codified
that sentiment over fifty years ago, when it passed the Gun Control Act of
1968 (“GCA”) in response to the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy
and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.48 At the time, the GCA was intended to
control access to weapons by “those whose possession thereof [is] contrary to
37 Id.
38 Id. at 3, 6.
39 See TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., STATE STANDARDS FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT (2020),
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/state-standards/state-standards-for-civil-commitment.pdf (listing each state’s involuntary commitment statute).
40 See id.
41 SAMHSA, supra note 35, at 9.
42 Id. at 9.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 12.
45 See, e.g., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra note 39, at 27, 46, 65 (Maine, North Carolina, and Utah).
46 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
47 United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United
States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010)).
48 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974); J. Baxter Stegall, Comment,
The Curse of Ham: Disarmament Through Discrimination—The Necessity of Applying Strict Scrutiny
to Second Amendment Issues in Order to Prevent Racial Discrimination by States and Localities
Through Gun Control Laws, 11 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 271, 300–01 (2016).
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the public interest.”49 Accordingly, Congress was primarily concerned with
preventing crime by keeping “firearms out of the hands of those not legally
entitled to possess them,” whether due to age, criminal background, or
mental incapacity.50 As the Supreme Court confirmed in Huddleston v.
United States, Congress’s purpose for enacting the law was never in doubt—it
specifically aimed to prevent certain classes of individuals from owning or
possessing firearms.51
Among those classes are individuals with severe mental illness. Under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), Congress specifically prohibits the shipping, receiving,
transporting, or possessing of firearms by those “[1] who ha[ve] been adjudicated as a mental defective or [2] who ha[ve] been committed to a mental
institution.”52 Congress enacted the provision after conducting a multiyear
analysis on gun violence, which uncovered “a serious problem of firearms
misuse in the United States.”53 Thus, members of Congress thought it necessary to prevent “mental incompetents” and “persons with a history of mental
disturbances” from possessing firearms.54 In doing so, the statutory provision
aimed to prohibit firearm ownership among those who “by their previous
conduct or mental condition” have proven themselves “incapable of handling a dangerous weapon in . . . an open society.”55 Accordingly, Congress
enacted § 922(g)(4) to prevent certain mentally ill individuals from possessing firearms, based on their membership in one of the two statutory groups.
Under the first statutory category, the possession and ownership of firearms is prohibited when an individual has been “adjudicated as a mental
defective.”56 That adjudication occurs when a court or other lawful authority
determines that the individual “is a danger to himself or to others”; “lacks the
mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs”; is found insane by a
court in a criminal case; or is found incompetent to stand trial or found “not
guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility.”57 Under the second statutory category, firearm possession and ownership is similarly prohibited for
those who have been committed to a mental institution. An individual falls
into that category when a court or other lawful authority has formally committed that individual to a mental health facility or hospital, a psychiatric
facility, a sanitarium, or a psychiatric ward of a general hospital.58 Notably,
the provision excludes those who have temporarily stayed in a mental institu49 Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 824; Stegall, supra note 48, at 304–06.
50 Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 823–24 (quoting S. REP. NO. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)).
51 Id. at 827.
52 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
53 Brief for the Appellees, supra note 6, at 22 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-1866, at 3
(1966)).
54 114 CONG. REC. 21,784 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler).
55 Id. 21,809–10 (statement of Rep. Tenzer).
56 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
57 27 C.F.R. § 478.11(2)(b)(2) (2020).
58 Id.; see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., FEDERAL FIREARMS PROHIBITION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 922(G)(4): PERSONS ADJUDICATED
AS A MENTAL DEFECTIVE OR COMMITTED TO A MENTAL INSTITUTION (2009), https://
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tion for observation and those who admitted themselves voluntarily.59 Nonetheless, if the statute does apply and is subsequently violated, the penalties
are severe—violators can be punished by a fine of $250,000, imprisoned for
up to ten years, or both.60
While § 922(g)(4) appears to create a blanket prohibition on firearm
ownership for those affected, Congress has in fact codified an opportunity
for relief.61 Under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), the U.S. Attorney General (“AG”) has
the legal discretion to restore an individual’s right to obtain a firearm.62 To
do so, the AG must review the record and circumstances of the case and find
that the person is unlikely “to act in a manner dangerous to public safety,”
such that restoring the right “would not be contrary to the public interest.”63
However, Congress defunded this relief from disabilities program in 1992
and has maintained the bar on funding ever since.64 The decision to defund
was the result of a policy judgment among Congress members, who concluded that determining eligibility under § 925(c) had proven to be a “very
difficult and subjective task” with potentially “devastating consequences.”65
Nonetheless, in 2008, Congress reopened the possibility for relief by
authorizing federal grants for states under 34 U.S.C. § 40915, as part of the
NICS Improvement Amendments Act (NIAA).66 The statute authorizes federal grants to help states determine which of their citizens are eligible to
purchase firearms and to assist in supplying that information to federal
databases.67 To receive one of the grants, states are required to implement a
relief from disabilities program, allowing an individual who has been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or committed to a mental institution to petition
for a restoration of his or her rights.68
For the program to qualify, it must first permit an individual barred
from firearm ownership under § 922(g)(4) to apply to the state for relief.69
Subsequently, when a state court or other lawful authority evaluates the application, it must consider three factors: “(1) the circumstances regarding the
firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4); (2) the petitioner’s
www.atf.gov/resource-center/docs/guide/atf-i-33104-%E2%80%94-federal-firearmsprohibitions-under-18-usc-%C2%A7-922g4-%E2%80%93/download.
59 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.
60 See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, supra note 58.
61 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (2018).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308, 312–13 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir.
2016) (en banc).
65 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting S. REP. No. 102353, at 19 (1992)).
66 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-180, § 105, 121 Stat.
2559, 2569–70 (2008) (codified at 34 U.S.C. § 40915 (2018)); Tyler I, 775 F.3d at 313.
67 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1119 (discussing the NIAA’s purpose).
68 Id. at 1110 n.3, 1111–12 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)).
69 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(1).
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‘record’; and (3) the petitioner’s ‘reputation.’”70 Additionally, the court
must find that the petitioner “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous
to public safety,” and that granting the relief “would not be contrary to the
public interest.”71 Finally, if the person is denied relief under the state program, he or she must be allowed to petition the state court for a de novo
judicial review.72 Since the passage of the NIAA, about thirty states have created qualifying relief programs.73
III. RECENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS: HELLER

AND

MCDONALD

Within the judiciary, however, § 922(g)(4) continues to face its own separate challenges. Though § 922(g)(4) was enacted decades ago, two more
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have strongly influenced modern judicial
interpretations of the provision.74 While neither case directly references
§ 922(g)(4), a few key passages do implicate the constitutionality of laws
regarding gun ownership for those with mental illness. The first and most
significant case—District of Columbia v. Heller—was decided in 2008 and signified the Court’s first attempt at an “in-depth examination of the Second
Amendment.”75 Writing for the 5–4 majority, Justice Scalia cautioned that
the case would not “clarify the entire field,” as the Court could later expound
on its reasoning when other cases raise new questions.76 Nonetheless, Justice
Scalia did discuss several structural implications of the Second Amendment,
stating that it divided naturally into two parts: the prefatory clause (“A well
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”) and the
operative clause (“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed”).77 Though Justice Scalia recognized that the clauses are linked,
he rejected the idea that the prefatory clause “limit[s] or expand[s] the
scope” of the operative clause.78 Instead, Justice Scalia concluded that the
prefatory clause merely “announces the purpose” for which the right to bear
arms was codified: the preservation of citizen militias.79 Even so, Justice
Scalia said, the clause should not be read as narrowly as other judges, includ70 Mai v. United States, No. C17-0561, 2018 WL 784582, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8,
2018) (quoting NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 § 105(a)(2)).
71 Id. (quoting NICS Improvement Amendments Act § 105(a)(2)).
72 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 40915(a)(3)).
73 Id.
74 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
75 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 576–77 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II). The prefatory clause refers to the
first half of the Second Amendment (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State . . .”), while the operative clause refers to the latter half (“. . . the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). See id.; U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
78 Heller, 554 U.S. at 578.
79 Id. at 599.
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ing the dissenters, have suggested.80 Rather, the concern regarding the militia served only as the impetus for codification of the right in the Constitution,
though “most” thought the Second Amendment provided important protection for self-defense and hunting as well.81
When discussing the operative clause—the main section of the opinion—Justice Scalia undertook an extensive study of the history and text of
the Second Amendment. First, he concluded that one particular phrase in
the Amendment, “right of the people,” refers to an individual right—after
all, Justice Scalia argued, the First and Fourth Amendments of the
unamended Constitution and Bill of Rights used the exact same phrase and
“unambiguously” referred to individual rights.82 Next, the opinion analyzed
the “keep and bear Arms” portion of the clause, relying on dictionaries from
the Founding era and uses of the terms in early documents.83 In doing so,
Justice Scalia wrote, there was no indication that keeping and bearing arms
was specifically confined to the use of weapons within an organized militia.84
Ultimately, “[p]utting all of [those] textual elements together,” Justice Scalia
concluded that the operative clause itself guarantees an individual right to
possess firearms “in case of confrontation,” including for self-defense.85
Nonetheless, perhaps the most influential part of the opinion—or at
least most relevant for this Note—is the recognition that even an individual
right to bear arms is “not unlimited.”86 As Justice Scalia stated, commentators and courts throughout history have clarified that the Second Amendment did not establish a right to keep “any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”87 Instead, Justice Scalia
explicitly noted that “nothing” in Heller should be construed as casting doubt
on “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms” for certain individuals, including felons and the mentally ill.88 In an accompanying footnote, Justice Scalia deemed the prohibitions for the two latter categories
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”89 Accordingly, Heller affirmed
the notion that restricting particular classes of people from bearing arms is
“presumptively lawful.”
80 Id. at 577.
81 Id. at 599.
82 Id. at 579. The other uses of the phrase “right of the people” can be found “in the
First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Searchand-Seizure Clause.” Id. Justice Scalia also noted that the Ninth Amendment employed
similar phrasing: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” Id. (quoting U.S. CONST.
amend. IX). Justice Scalia argued that each of those uses “unambiguously” denotes an
individual, not a collective, right. Id.
83 Id. at 581–86.
84 Id. at 585.
85 Id. at 592.
86 Id. at 626.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 627 n.26.
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Though Heller clarified the basic meaning and the preliminary scope of
the Second Amendment, the opinion—as Justice Scalia predicted—left open
several questions. The Court resolved one of them two years later in McDonald v. City of Chicago, which decided whether the Second Amendment applied
to the states.90 In another 5–4 decision, the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment indeed incorporates the Second Amendment.91 As such, the
individual right to keep and bear arms, as established in Heller, is now controlling on both the federal government and the states.92 Notably, however,
the Court echoed Heller’s qualification that the Second Amendment right is
not unlimited. Recounting that Heller “did not cast doubt” on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, the
Court expressly stated that it “repeat[s] those assurances” in McDonald.93 As
such, the Court concluded that even incorporation of an individual right to
possess firearms would “not imperil every law regulating firearms.”94
IV. RECENT APPLICATIONS

OF

HELLER

Within the circuit courts, Heller and McDonald immediately began to
shape Second Amendment jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to
§ 922(g)(4). In 2010, the Third Circuit handed down an influential opinion
in United States v. Marzzarella, in which the court developed a two-pronged
approach for general Second Amendment challenges.95 It thought the relevant inquiry under Heller should first ask “whether the challenged law
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment[ ].”96 If it does not, the inquiry is over. However, if the opposite conclusion is reached, the second prong then requires the court to “evaluate the
law under some form of means-end scrutiny.”97 Should the law pass muster
under the selected standard, it is constitutional; if it fails to do so, the court
must invalidate the law.98
Though the Third Circuit specifically applied its new two-pronged
approach in the context of § 922(k), which prohibits possession of firearms
with an obliterated serial number,99 its sister circuits have broadly employed
the test for other Second Amendment challenges. For instance, the Sixth
Circuit applied the two-pronged approach in United States v. Greeno to evaluate a provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, after the defendant
claimed the application of a dangerous weapon enhancement to his sentence
90 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
91 Id. at 750.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 786.
94 Id.
95 United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 87.
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violated the Second Amendment.100 The Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have similarly applied the two-pronged approach to their Second
Amendment cases, more or less in the exact same terms.101
Within the last five years, multiple circuits have had occasion to consider
Marzzarella’s two-pronged approach in the specific context of § 922(g)(4).
One of the most notable was the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Tyler v. Hillsdale
County Sheriff’s Department (Tyler II).102 The 2016 en banc decision vacated a
2014 panel decision,103 ultimately concluding that the plaintiff had a “viable
claim under the Second Amendment.”104 As it did in Greeno, the Sixth Circuit again employed the two-pronged approach to evaluate the plaintiff’s asapplied challenge to § 922(g)(4).105 The plaintiff, then seventy-four years
old, had been involuntarily committed in 1986 after his wife served him with
divorce papers.106 The Sixth Circuit first concluded under step one that
individuals, such as the plaintiff, who had been involuntarily committed “are
not categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.”107 However, the
court noted the particular challenge of “mapping” Heller’s language onto the
two-step test.108 In fact, the opinion conceded that it was “difficult to discern” whether prohibitions on firearms for the mentally ill are “presumptively lawful” because these prohibitions “do not burden persons within the
ambit of the Second Amendment as historically understood,” or “whether the
regulations presumptively satisfy some form of heightened means-end scrutiny.”109 The Sixth Circuit ultimately opted for the latter option, stating that
prohibitions on firearms for the mentally ill had “at best ambiguous historical
support.”110 Thus, the court proceeded to step two of the test and chose to
apply intermediate scrutiny to evaluate § 922(g)(4).111 Ultimately, the court
found that while the government had a legitimate interest in preventing firearms from reaching “presumptively risky people,”112 the government had not
100 United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518–20 (6th Cir. 2012).
101 Id. at 518. In United States v. Chester, the Fourth Circuit applied the two-pronged
approach to a challenge under § 922(g)(9), which prohibits possession of firearms for
those who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 628 F.3d
673, 677, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit also employed the Marzzarella approach
in Ezell v. City of Chicago, which considered a city ordinance that mandated firing-range
training as a prerequisite for gun ownership yet banned firing ranges in the city. 651 F.3d
684, 704–10 (7th Cir. 2011). Finally, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Reese applied the
test for § 922(g)(8). 627 F.3d 792, 800–04 (10th Cir. 2010).
102 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
103 Tyler I, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), rev’d en banc, 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016).
104 Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 699.
105 Id. at 681, 685.
106 Id. at 683.
107 Id. at 690.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 692.
112 Id. at 693 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6
(1983)).
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fully satisfied its burden.113 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit found that the government had failed to prove a “reasonable fit” between its goal and
§ 922(g)(4)’s lifetime ban on those with prior involuntary commitments.114
As the government had not offered sufficient proof of the “continued risk”
imposed by such individuals, the court decided that the lifetime ban was not
justified.115
Three years later, the Third Circuit reached a drastically different conclusion in Beers v. Attorney General116—the case highlighted in this Note’s
introduction. Beers, a college student deemed suicidal and involuntarily
committed multiple times, also brought an as-applied challenge to
§ 922(g)(4).117 While the Third Circuit similarly used the traditional twopronged approach, it ended the inquiry at the first step.118 The decision
adhered closely to the Third Circuit’s prior ruling in Binderup v. Attorney General, in which the court considered an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1),
the felon-in-possession provision.119 In Binderup, the Third Circuit had further defined step one of the two-pronged test and established requirements
that a plaintiff must satisfy to show that a “law imposes a burden on conduct
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”120 Specifically, the plaintiff “must (1) identify the traditional justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be
a member, and then (2) present facts about himself and his background that
distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred
class.”121
In Binderup, the Third Circuit concluded that neither the length of time
elapsed since the conviction nor a showing of rehabilitation should be considered under the constitutional inquiry.122 Beers applied the same reasoning to § 922(g)(4) and concluded that those factors were also irrelevant in
the context of that provision,123 as time and rehabilitation historically were
never sufficient to “restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited.”124 As such, Beers could not seek to distinguish himself from those
historically barred from firearm ownership by claiming he was “no longer a
danger to himself or to others.”125 Rather, the Third Circuit concluded that
Beers could seek to distinguish himself only by “demonstrating that he was
113 Id. at 699.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019).
117 See id. at 152.
118 Id. at 159.
119 836 F.3d 336, 340 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
120 Id. at 359 (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
121 Id. at 347 (citation omitted).
122 Id. at 350.
123 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
124 Id. (quoting Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350).
125 Id.
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never determined to be a danger to himself or to others” in the first place.126
As Beers had specifically been deemed as such by a court on two separate
occasions, the Third Circuit rejected his challenge.127 Thus, as applied to
Beers, § 922(g)(4) did “not burden conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment,”128 thereby ending the inquiry at step one and rendering the provision constitutional.
Less than a year after the Third Circuit’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit considered yet another challenge to § 922(g)(4) in Mai v. United States. Similar
to the previous two cases, the Ninth Circuit challenge involved a prior involuntary commitment from which the plaintiff alleged he had been rehabilitated.129 The Ninth Circuit’s approach to the plaintiff’s challenge perhaps
reflects the middle ground between Tyler II and Beers, as the Ninth Circuit
ultimately upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) but only after completing both steps of the Marzzarella/Greeno test. Under the first step, the Ninth
Circuit opted to “assume, without deciding,” that § 922(g)(4) burdened Second Amendment rights as applied to the plaintiff.130 Like the Sixth Circuit
in Tyler II, the Ninth Circuit proceeded to step two of the inquiry and also
opted for intermediate scrutiny.131 However, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the
court in Mai found that the government had shown both a compelling interest in preventing crime and suicide and a reasonable fit between that interest
and the law.132 In reaching that conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on statistics, such as the high likelihood of suicide among those who had been
involuntarily committed, and on § 922(g)(4)’s dangerousness requirement.133 As § 922(g)(4) applies only to those who were found “actually dangerous” through a qualifying proceeding, the Ninth Circuit deemed the
provision “more narrowly tailored” than other provisions it upheld in the
past, such as § 922(g)(1).134
V.

THE WAY FORWARD

Given the aforementioned precedents, a clear divide has emerged on
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4). Still, much of that divide has centered
on the second step of the Marzzarella/Greeno test—the level of scrutiny to
apply and whether § 922(g)(4) satisfies it.135 However, this Note argues that
the first step of the aforementioned test warrants greater consideration and
indeed provides an answer to the constitutional question, in at least the
126 Id.
127 Id. at 152, 159.
128 Id. at 159.
129 See Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020).
130 Id. at 1115.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1117, 1120.
133 Id. at 1121.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115–17; Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 690, 692, 699 (6th Cir.
2016).
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majority of cases. Under that step, courts consider whether the law at issue
burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment.136 If it does not,
courts have no need to apply means-end scrutiny, thereby ending the inquiry
at step one.137 Given that framework, the general analysis in Beers should
serve as the proper constitutional guide to deciding as-applied challenges to
§ 922(g)(4). Based on that precedent, as-applied challenges to the provision
should rarely, if ever, succeed.
This Note proposes several channels through which courts could deem
§ 922(g)(4) constitutional under step one of the Marzzarella/Greeno test,
using the express language of Tyler II, Beers, and Mai. The first two options
focus specifically on the Ninth Circuit’s understanding of that step of the test.
In Mai, the Ninth Circuit stated that a law will not burden Second Amendment rights “if it either falls within one of the ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller or regulates conduct that historically has
fallen outside the scope of the Second Amendment.”138 While Mai did not
resolve the case at this step, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless noted that the
government had presented a “strong argument” that § 922(g)(4) survives
under both inquiries, such that the law would not burden constitutionally
protected conduct.139 However, Mai’s suggestion should be taken a step further, as both Heller and the historical scope of the Second Amendment lend
support to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4). Aside from those inquiries,
the third option relies specifically on Beers to analyze constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(4). While the inquiry is narrower than under Mai, the
Third Circuit’s approach serves as another feasible route to upholding the
law under step one of the Marzzarella/Greeno test. With those options in
place, courts should no longer sidestep the first prong of the test in favor of
means-end scrutiny—instead, they can and should resolve cases under step
one.
A.

Option One: The “Presumptively Lawful” Category Under Heller

Under Heller, the Court identified certain “longstanding prohibitions”
on firearm possession as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”140
Within that category, the Court specifically included prohibitions for “felons
and the mentally ill,” noting that “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken
to cast doubt” on those restrictions.141 Nonetheless, the Court never clarified how lower courts should interpret its “presumptively lawful” language,
giving rise to differing interpretations across the courts of appeals.142 While
136 See Mai, 952 F.3d at 1113.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 1114 (quoting United States v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2019)).
139 See id.
140 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008).
141 Id. at 626.
142 See, e.g., Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 686–87 (6th Cir. 2016) (“We do not take Heller’s
‘presumptively lawful’ dictum to foreclose § 922(g)(4) from constitutional scrutiny.”);
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We recognize the phrase
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alternative interpretations have been advanced, the most logical reading of
the opinion is to consider the restrictions as “exceptions” to the Second
Amendment right.143 As the Third Circuit argued in Marzzarella, that reading best comports with Heller’s text and structure.144
For instance, when naming the presumptively lawful regulations, the
Heller Court used key language to describe firearm restrictions for those considered mentally ill. The Court specifically stated that its opinion casts no
doubt on “prohibitions” on firearm possession, not merely on regulations for
these individuals.145 As such, scholars have correctly argued that the majority indeed sanctioned the “categorical exclusion” of both felons and the mentally ill from Second Amendment protection.146 While the specific reason
for singling out these two groups in particular is unknown,147 the implication
for firearm possession among felons and the mentally ill is clear—individuals
in both of these groups fall outside the scope of the Amendment.
The structure of the Heller opinion also bolsters Marzzarella’s reading.
Directly after listing the presumptively lawful regulations, the Heller Court
considered restrictions on the types of weapons that Americans can lawfully
obtain.148 The Court specifically defined said restrictions as “another important limitation” on the Second Amendment right.149 The Court then clarified that certain dangerous weapons fall outside the scope of the
Amendment itself, such that the Amendment “does not protect” them.150
Thus, in comparing the presumptively lawful regulations with the weapons
restrictions and describing both with the same term, the Heller Court likely
aimed to “treat them equivalently,” both being exceptions to the Second
Amendment.151
1.

“Mentally Ill” Phrasing and § 922(g)(4)

One criticism of relying on Heller to decide the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(4) relates to a crucial phrase in Heller. While the opinion discussed
the presumptive lawfulness of prohibitions for the “mentally ill,” § 922(g)(4)
never explicitly references that term.152 Instead, the provision refers to those
who have been “adjudicated as a mental defective” or who have been “com‘presumptively lawful’ could have different meanings under newly enunciated Second
Amendment doctrine.”).
143 This reading was advocated by the Third Circuit in Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
144 See id.
145 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
146 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 414 (2009).
147 See id.
148 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (discussing Heller’s structure).
149 Heller, 554 U.S. at 627; see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
150 Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
151 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
152 Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018).
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mitted to a mental institution.”153 However, as Judge Moore argued in her
Tyler II dissent, Heller was “almost certainly” describing § 922(g)(4) when it
discussed longstanding prohibitions for the mentally ill.154
First, only one federal statute could feasibly be regarded as a prohibition
on firearm ownership among the mentally ill—§ 922(g)(4).155 Generally,
the Gun Control Act of 1968, codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), is the
overarching source of federal firearms law as it relates to the mentally ill.156
While other federal statutes implicate firearm ownership for these individuals, only § 922(g)(4) directly imposes a prohibition. For example, 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(c) and the NICS Improvement Amendments Act allow for the restoration of firearm privileges for those who fall within the purview of
§ 922(g)(4), as discussed in preceding sections.157 However, those provisions specifically provide for the reinstatement of firearms privileges for certain
mentally ill individuals, not for a prohibition on such privileges, as Heller
explicitly states.158 Further, as those provisions were enacted even later in
history than the Gun Control Act of 1968, which itself was enacted 177 years
after the ratification of the Second Amendment, they are unlikely to be
deemed “longstanding.”159
Finally, interpreting Heller as a reference to § 922(g)(4) also fits with the
widespread judicial understanding of the other “longstanding” prohibition in
Heller—that which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. In the same
sentence, the Heller opinion described as presumptively lawful the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms” by both “felons and the
mentally ill.”160 While the connection between the “mentally ill” language
and § 922(g)(4) has been challenged, several courts have at least implied
that the “felon” language clearly refers to § 922(g)(1).161 Notably, however,
the Heller opinion never stated that the “longstanding prohibitions” it men153 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
154 Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 716 (6th Cir. 2016) (Moore, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 18 U.S.C. § 922; John Malcolm & Amy Swearer, Part III: The Current State of Laws
Regarding Mental Illness and Guns, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://
www.heritage.org/civil-society/report/part-iii-the-current-state-laws-regarding-mental-illness-and-guns.
157 18 U.S.C. § 925(c); NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 34 U.S.C.).
158 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (referring specifically to
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill” (emphasis
added)).
159 See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1357 (2009); Gregory J. Pals, Note, Judicial Review Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 925(c): Abrogation Through Appropriations?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1095, 1097 (1998).
160 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
161 See, e.g., Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (referring to § 922(g)(1) as a “presumptively lawful regulatory measure”); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting the sentence on “longstanding
prohibitions” in Heller and subsequently concluding that § 922(g)(1) falls under the presumptively lawful category).
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tioned were in fact referring to § 922(g)(1). Further, there are numerous
other federal and state statutes that implicate felons’ gun rights, including 18
U.S.C. § 925(c).162 Thus, if the term “felons” in Heller indeed refers to
§ 922(g)(1), the same presumption should apply with respect to § 922(g)(4)
and Heller’s reference to the “mentally ill.”
2.

Prevailing Analysis of § 922(g)(1)

Further, resolving the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4) directly under Heller would be consistent with the overarching and prevailing analysis of the
federal felon-in-possession statute, § 922(g)(1).163 In fact, as Judge Moore
discussed in her Tyler II dissent, deciding challenges to § 922(g)(4) in any
other way would call into question the current approach to § 922(g)(1)
among various courts of appeals.164
Under § 922(g)(1), a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year cannot purchase or possess a firearm—a
lifelong prohibition with the same consequences as § 922(g)(4).165 After
Heller, challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) have been uniformly
rejected, notably without subjecting the provision to any level of scrutiny.166
In fact, the Sixth Circuit itself, which invalidated § 922(g)(4) in Tyler II,
upheld § 922(g)(1) in 2010, basing its decision on the express language of
Heller.167 Specifically, the court quoted the oft-used phrase in Heller—“nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons”—and noted that the phrase has
been “sufficient to dispose” of § 922(g)(1) challenges in its sister circuits.168
The Sixth Circuit implicitly accepted that reasoning in its own decision
regarding § 922(g)(1), stating that Heller’s express language “does not bring
into question the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).”169
162 Restoration of Rts. Project, 50-State Comparison: Loss & Restoration of Civil/Firearms
Rights, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/chart-1-loss-and-restoration-of-civil-rights-and-firearms-privileges/ (Jan. 4,
2021).
163 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018).
164 See Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 714 (6th Cir. 2016) (Moore, J., dissenting).
165 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
166 United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing cases from
several other circuits that heard challenges to § 922(g)(1)).
167 Id. at 508.
168 Id. at 507 (alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 626 (2008)) (first citing United States v. Stuckey, 317 F. App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2009);
then citing United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); then citing
United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); then citing United States v.
Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008); then citing United States v. Smith, 329 F.
App’x 109, 110–11 (9th Cir. 2009); then citing United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037,
1047 (10th Cir. 2009); and then citing United States v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 478, 479–81
(11th Cir. 2009)).
169 Id. at 508.
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Based on that holding, a court would need to distinguish § 922(g)(1)
from § 922(g)(4) to invalidate the latter. However, the phrasing of Heller
itself casts doubt on any feasible possibility of doing so. Specifically, the same
sentence used to uphold § 922(g)(1) across multiple circuits mentions not
only felons, but also the mentally ill. As Heller states, “nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”170 If that phrasing is
“sufficient to dispose” of challenges to § 922(g)(1), as related to felons, Heller
should also dispose of similar challenges to § 922(g)(4), as related to the
mentally ill. While the Tyler II majority offered a few distinguishing points,
none is sufficient to justify the differential treatment of the two provisions.
Among other reasons, the Tyler II majority considers Heller inconclusive
as related to § 922(g)(4) in part due to the provision’s “lack of historical
pedigree.”171 The majority explained that firearm prohibitions on the mentally ill arose in the twentieth century, with § 922(g)(4) passing in 1968.172
As such, the opinion concluded that “it would be odd” to use the express
language of Heller alone to “rubber stamp” a permanent prohibition on firearms for past involuntary commitment.173 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit—
and several sister circuits—did just that in dismissing similar challenges to
§ 922(g)(1).174 As Judge Moore notes in dissent, the first federal statute
prohibiting felons from possessing firearms also arose in the twentieth century.175 Section 922(g)(1), specifically, was enacted in 1961—a mere seven
years before § 922(g)(4).176 Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s use of historical pedigree could scarcely support a distinction between the two provisions.177
Should history serve as a relevant factor in interpreting Heller’s language,
then both § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(4) would face similar constitutional difficulties, though the former has easily withstood such challenges.178
Additionally, the Tyler II majority distinguishes the lifetime ban that
§ 922(g)(4) imposes, particularly as it relates to those who have recovered
from previous mental illness.179 In its reasoning, the majority claims that
Heller’s “presumption of lawfulness” is “call[ed] into question” by factual circumstances such as those in Tyler II, wherein the plaintiff was involuntarily
committed decades prior to seeking firearm ownership.180 Ultimately, the
majority concluded, Heller should not be interpreted as “enshrin[ing] a permanent stigma” on those who have been involuntarily committed to a mental
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (emphasis added).
Tyler II, 837 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id.
See Khami, 362 F. App’x at 507.
Tyler II, 837 F.3d at 715 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.
See id. at 716.
Id. at 688 (majority opinion).
Id.
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institution.181 Nonetheless, the same logic directly maps onto § 922(g)(1),
especially as it relates to nonviolent felons and to felons convicted years
ago.182 For instance, an individual convicted of a nonviolent drug offense in
1980 could have rehabilitated himself, just as the plaintiff arguably did in
Tyler II.183 However, because the convicted felon is barred from firearm ownership under § 922(g)(1), instead of § 922(g)(4), his constitutional challenge is unlikely to prevail in the Sixth Circuit or its sister circuits, based on
existing precedent. Still, there is little reason to believe that he poses a
greater danger to himself or to society than does the plaintiff in Tyler II, or
any other individual disenfranchised under § 922(g)(4).184 Thus, Tyler II’s
reasoning on this point should apply with equal force to § 922(g)(1), absent
any unmentioned differentiating factor.
Given the applicability of the above arguments to both § 922(g)(1) and
§ 922(g)(4), the Sixth Circuit and several of its sister circuits face a predicament. Though challenges to § 922(g)(1) have been uniformly rejected, the
Sixth Circuit’s reasoning under Tyler II could easily provide support for invalidating the provision.185 Without a sufficient distinguishing characteristic
between § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(4), no reasonable justification exists for
the disparate treatment. Thus, § 922(g)(4) should be interpreted in accordance with the prevailing analysis of § 922(g)(1), which would compel courts
to decide the constitutional question without subjecting the provision to any
heightened scrutiny.
B.

Option Two: Historical Scope of the Second Amendment

Historically, individuals with mental illness have also fallen outside the
scope of the Second Amendment, rendering their constitutional challenges
under § 922(g)(4) similarly unavailing.186 As Heller states, the Second
Amendment “codified a pre-existing right,”187 whose existence is not “in any
manner dependent upon” the Constitution.188 Thus, any exclusions or limitations on the right to bear arms that existed when the Constitution was ratified continue to exist today.189 That general limitation applies to those with
a history of mental illness, as these individuals have traditionally been
deemed “dangerous to the public or to themselves,” rendering them “outside
of the scope of Second Amendment protection.”190
While federal laws regulating firearm possession for the mentally ill are
relatively new, courts have employed “tools of deduction” to evaluate histori181 Id.
182 See id. at 716 (Moore, J., dissenting).
183 Powell, supra note 17, at 596.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).
187 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
188 Id. (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876)).
189 See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
190 Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150, 157 (3d Cir. 2019).
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cal prohibitions for this group.191 During the eighteenth century, courts
have noted, statutes explicitly barring the mentally ill from firearm ownership would have been unnecessary.192 During that period, justices of the
peace could simply “lock up” perceived “lunatics” who were considered dangerous.193 Several courts have extrapolated on such authority in the context
of firearm possession.194 Namely, if depriving a person of his physical liberty
was allowed, then the less drastic act of removing the person’s firearms would
similarly have been acceptable.195
Further, scholars largely agree that at the Founding, the right to keep
and bear arms was tied to the concept of a “virtuous citizenry.”196 As such,
that understanding would not prohibit the passage of laws that prevent the
“unvirtuous” or those “deemed incapable of virtue” from possessing firearms.197 Though individuals “who have committed or are likely to commit”
violent crimes are the clearest historical example of the “unvirtuous,” the
category is not limited to violent criminals.198 Instead, the “unvirtuous” also
include those individuals who have “committed a serious criminal offense,
violent or nonviolent,”199 and those with a history of mental illness.200 As
such, these individuals would have fallen outside the category of “law-abiding,
responsible citizens” for whom the individual right to bear arms was confirmed in Heller.201 Indeed, at the Founding era, disarming felons and those
who would fall within § 922(g)(4)—individuals committed to a mental institution or adjudicated as a mental defective—would comport with the general
right to bear arms.202
191 Id. at 157 n.43.
192 See id. at 157–58.
193 Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v.
Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1377 (2009) (quoting HENRY CARE,
ENGLISH LIBERTIES, OR THE FREE-BORN SUBJECT’S INHERITANCE 329 (William Nelson ed.,
Providence, Shakespear’s Head 6th ed. 1774) (1680)).
194 See, e.g., Jefferies v. Sessions, 278 F. Supp. 3d 831, 841 (E.D. Pa. 2017); Keyes v.
Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
195 See, e.g., Beers, 927 F.3d at 158; Jefferies, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 841; Keyes, 195 F. Supp. 3d
at 718.
196 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d
185, 201 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment
Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1359 (2009)).
197 Kates & Cramer, supra note 196, at 1360.
198 Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 348 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
199 Id.
200 Brief for the Appellees at 16, Beers, 927 F.3d 150 (No. 17-3010).
201 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); Brief for the Appellees at
13, Beers, 927 F.3d 150 (No. 17-3010).
202 See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001); Brief for the
Appellees at 13, Beers, 927 F.3d 150 (No. 17-3010); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does
the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983) (“Colonial
and English societies of the eighteenth century, as well as their modern counterparts, have
excluded infants, idiots, lunatics, and felons [from the right to keep and bear arms].”);
Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear
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Additionally, laws barring felons from obtaining firearms also arose in
later decades, though many courts and scholars have accepted the historical
disarmament of this group without question.203 As noted, federal law did not
prohibit firearm ownership among felons until 1938, and the current firearms ban for both violent and nonviolent felons came to fruition only in
1961.204 Nonetheless, several courts have relied exclusively on Heller and its
discussion of “longstanding prohibitions” on felons in possession of firearms
to reject challenges to § 922(g)(1).205 Others have also relied on scholarly
discussions of common-law limitations on the right to bear arms, which have
concluded that felons inherently fell outside the scope of that right.206 Thus,
while the limitation was not codified under federal law until centuries later,
scholars have widely adhered to the notion that criminals, whether or not
violent, were prevented from keeping and bearing arms in the Founding
era.207 In fact, the Heller Court itself considered as “highly influential” a
Pennsylvania report from 1787 that addressed commonly understood limitations on the right to bear arms.208 That report stated that “no law shall be
passed for disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes committed,
or real danger of public injury.”209 Thus, its drafters specifically recognized
the exclusion of criminals from Second Amendment protection. As circuit
courts have similarly noted, many states—which had also guaranteed a right
to bear arms in their own constitutions—“did not extend this right to persons
convicted of crime.”210 Even though their constitutions lacked specific
exceptions for criminals, such restrictions were “understood” in the eightArms,” 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 1986, at 151, 161 (stating that “violent criminals,
children, and those of unsound mind may be deprived of firearms”).
203 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 348 (“Several of our sister circuits endorse the ‘virtuous citizen’ justification for excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the Second Amendment’s ambit.”); United States v. Carpio–Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979–80 (4th Cir. 2012)
(“[F]elons ‘were excluded from the right to arms’ because they were deemed unvirtuous.”
(quoting Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV.
461, 480 (1995))); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 1986, at 143, 146 (“One implication of this emphasis on the virtuous citizen
is that the right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e.,
criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable
of virtue.”).
204 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
205 United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that
plaintiff’s challenge to § 922(g)(1) was “foreclosed” by Circuit’s prior precedent, and that
Heller offers “no basis for reconsidering” that precedent); United States v. McCane, 573
F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiff’s § 922(g)(1) challenge, relying exclusively on Heller’s “longstanding prohibitions” language and on Anderson).
206 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 349 (surveying several sources on felons’ right to bear arms).
207 See id.
208 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604 (2008); id. at 658 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
209 Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 665 (1971)).
210 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
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eenth century.211 As a result, the lack of written, legalized exceptions for
felons does not imply that these individuals fell within the scope of the Second Amendment, as the aforementioned sources have recognized.
Accordingly, the similar lack of formalized exceptions to the right to
bear arms for the mentally ill does not signify historical support for such a
right. As the Pennsylvania report acknowledged, not only did those who
committed crimes lack a personal right to possess firearms, but so did those
who posed a “real danger of public injury.”212 At the Founding, those with a
history of mental illness or those of unsound mind were not among those
individuals permitted to bear arms without posing such a danger to the public.213 In fact, these individuals could even be removed from their communities and restricted in their physical liberty, confined to their homes or
institutionalized.214 Accordingly, if such grave consequences were imposed
on individuals with mental illness throughout history, there is little reason to
doubt the implication that they similarly fell outside the scope of those protected by the Second Amendment.
C.

Option Three: The Beers Analysis

While the aforementioned two approaches focus on the Ninth Circuit’s
inquiry of the first step in the Marzzarella/Greeno test, the third option follows
the Third Circuit’s approach in Beers.215 This option tracks previously
applied precedent in the context of § 922(g)(1) and could provide another
valid alternative for courts evaluating similar challenges to § 922(g)(4).
Under the Third Circuit approach, to determine whether a law burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment, the plaintiff must “(1) identify
the traditional justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a member, and then (2) present
facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances
from those of persons in the historically barred class.”216 If a plaintiff is unable to meet those requirements, his challenge to § 922(g)(4) will fail.
211 Id. (citing STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT: ORIGINS OF
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 273 (2008)).
212 Heller, 554 U.S. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 209,
at 665).
213 Brief for the Appellees at 14, Beers v. Att’y Gen., 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (No.
17-3010).
214 Id. (citing GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF
AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL 5–21, 29, 43 (1994)).
215 In July 2019, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives approved
Pennsylvania’s relief program under the NIAA, which lawfully permitted Beers to possess a
firearm. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23, Beers v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (2020) (No. 19864). In May 2020, the Supreme Court subsequently vacated the judgment in Beers and
ordered the Third Circuit to dismiss the case as moot. Beers, 140 S. Ct. at 2759. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the case.
216 Beers, 927 F.3d at 157 (quoting Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 346–47 (3d Cir.
2016) (en banc)).
THE

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL413.txt

unknown

Seq: 23

25-MAR-21

8:51

2021]s e c o n d a m e n d m e n t c h a l l e n g e s t o 1 8 U . S . C . § 9 2 2 ( g ) ( 4 ) 1645

Under the first prong, Beers had already concluded that the historical
record supports the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4).217 After noting that
individuals deemed “dangerous to the public or to themselves” fell outside
the scope of the Second Amendment, the court concluded that the mentally
ill must have been included in that category.218 Relying on the historical
sources presented in the previous Section, the court noted the lawfulness of
physically confining “lunatics” and others similarly situated in the eighteenth
century, indicating that these individuals would not be considered capable of
possessing firearms.219 Thus, the Third Circuit deemed the mentally ill part
of the historically barred class, implying that those who fall within the scope
of § 922(g)(4) would inherently be included in that category.220
Next, the plaintiff would then need to distinguish himself from that
class, though an ability to do so under the Third Circuit approach would be
highly difficult.221 Relying on its precedent in Binderup, the Third Circuit
again concluded that evidence of reform or of the passage of time could not
be used to distinguish the plaintiff.222 Though Binderup specifically considered a challenge to § 922(g)(1), it determined that rehabilitation and the
passage of time are generally insufficient to “restore” forfeited Second
Amendment rights,223 even if they were forfeited outside of the context of
§ 922(g)(1). As Beers later stated, the rationale for disregarding those factors
under a § 922(g)(1) inquiry also applies to § 922(g)(4).224 Based on
Binderup’s findings, there exists “no historical support” for the restoration of
Second Amendment rights based on the passage of time or rehabilitation.225
Though Congress could opt to provide a remedy—as it did with § 925(c), for
example—such an act would be a “matter of legislative grace,” not of necessity.226 Further, the Beers court addressed the more practical challenge
courts face when considering the passage of time and rehabilitation. As the
Supreme Court has confirmed, the judiciary—and federal courts, in particular—is not “institutionally equipped’ to conduct ‘a neutral, wide-ranging
investigation’” into assessments of rehabilitation and recidivism.227 While
state courts are sometimes called to engage in a similar inquiry, namely by
deciding whether to involuntarily commit an individual, federal courts have
no role in that process.228 Thus, requiring federal courts to insert themselves
into the inquiry—and decide whether an individual has been rehabilitated or
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 158 (quoting Larson, supra note 193, at 1377).
220 See id.
221 Id. at 159.
222 Id.
223 Binderup v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
224 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
225 Id.
226 Binderup, 836 F.3d at 350.
227 Id. (quoting United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002)).
228 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159 n.52.
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whether a sufficient amount of time has passed since the disqualifying event
under § 922(g)(4)—would present logistical and conceptual challenges.
Based on those considerations, the Third Circuit’s inquiry has greatly
circumscribed the scope of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(4). In fact, the
court concluded in Beers that an individual in the historically barred class—
i.e., those with mental illness—can distinguish himself in only one way:
“[D]emonstrating that he was never determined to be a danger to himself or
to others.”229 However, as the majority of state statutes relating to involuntary commitment impose a dangerousness requirement,230 the odds of a
plaintiff succeeding in that endeavor are slim. As such, challenges to
§ 922(g)(4) would likely prevail in only rare cases under the Third Circuit’s
approach.
Given the historical backdrop of the Third Circuit’s analysis, other
courts could rely on the same historical sources to conduct their own Beersesque inquiry, notwithstanding the absence of Binderup in their precedent.
Based on those sources, the historical inquiry supports the exclusion of firearm rights for those with a history of mental illness, placing them inherently
within the historically barred class. Further, the Third Circuit approach
greatly streamlines the inquiry for as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(4). As
the effect of time and rehabilitation would be inherently difficult to evaluate231—and ripe for error—eliminating that inquiry would prevent federal
courts from engaging in a subjective judgment call. Additionally, as time and
rehabilitation have historically never supported a restoration of Second
Amendment rights,232 courts would remain well within the scope of their
precedent in rejecting such an inquiry. Thus, the Third Circuit’s approach
should serve as another viable alternative to evaluating challenges to
§ 922(g)(4).
CONCLUSION
Though § 922(g)(4) faces an uncertain fate across various circuits, the
constitutionality of the provision has indeed already been addressed by precedent and by historical sources. Given Heller’s recognition of “longstanding
prohibitions” on firearms by the mentally ill, several courts and scholars have
concluded that the mentally ill lie entirely outside the scope of the Second
Amendment.233 Further, the historical record supports the same conclusion,
as “lunatics” and those of unsound mind could lawfully lose their fundamental freedoms, which would include firearm possession.234 Given those
sources, courts should gain greater confidence in concluding that the federal
statute governing mental illness—§ 922(g)(4)—does not burden conduct
229 Id. at 159.
230 TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., supra note 39.
231 Beers, 927 F.3d at 159.
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 146, at 414.
234 Larson, supra note 193, at 1377 (quoting CARE, supra note 193, at 329).
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falling within the scope of the Second Amendment. Thus, as with
§ 922(g)(1)’s felon-in-possession provision, courts can and should decide
challenges to § 922(g)(4) without having to resort to means-end scrutiny.
This Note traced three approaches that courts could viably implement to
evaluate challenges to § 922(g)(4). Though none has gained universal
approval, each has substantial support in Supreme Court precedent, other
federal court precedent, or historical sources. Thus, courts would remain
within the scope of their authority in relying solely on step one of the Marzzarella/Greeno test to evaluate § 922(g)(4). While the Third Circuit has
served as the primary example in employing such an approach, other circuits
should and perhaps will follow its lead. In Mai, for instance, the Ninth Circuit ultimately proceeded to step two of the test but noted that a “strong
argument” had been made for resolving the challenge at the first step.235
Going forward, perhaps the court has already paved the way for a resolution
at that step within the Ninth Circuit and will follow through with its analysis
under that route. Though only time will determine the prevailing approach
to § 922(g)(4) challenges, the approaches outlined in this Note should each
serve as suitable ways to decide the constitutional question.

235

Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2020).
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